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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Turingia and the Republic of Babbage have brought their
case before this Court by notification of the Special Agreement as provided for
by Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The Court
has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 36(2) of the said Statute.
1H. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Turingia is a large, developed state with a highly educated and
technologically literate population. Babbage is a smaller developing state, with
little infrastructure, although the availability of Internet access for Babbagian
citizens has increased markedly in recent years. In 1994, the Babbagian
government promulgated a new Criminal Code. Section 117 of the Code
prohibited the publication of indecent material, which was defined to include
material targeted at and designed to offend members of a particular ethnic
group, and material offensive to the public morality of Babbage. On September
25 1999, the head of Babbage's government, President Revuluri, issued a
Presidential Declaration extending the legal scope of section 117 to embrace
material published or distributed on the Internet, and ordering all Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) operating in Babbage to eliminate any user access to
material which would violate section 117. Within two weeks of the Declaration,
all but one of the ISPs operating in Babbage employed restrictive blocking
software to comply with the legal prohibition in section 117. Such software also
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prohibited users from accessing sites of historical and medical interest, and
blocked other sites which were neither pornographic nor defamatory in intent.
Babbage OnLine (BOL), the dominant ISP in the Babbagian market and a
subsidiary of a Turingian-based company, Turingia OnLine (TOL), refused to
comply with the Presidential Declaration on grounds articulated by TOL's Chief
Executive Officer, namely its inconsistency with the international right to
freedom of expression. Charges were laid and proceedings successfully brought
against BOL and TOL. In order to protect its property against forfeiture, BOL
closed down its operations in Babbage and removed its assets. President
Revuluri warned that Babbage would not permit TOL to escape responsibility
for its actions.
On December 24 1999, a computer programmer illegally hacked into
TOL's computer system, erased the data which comprised TOL's pubiically
available websites and deleted the system programmes that controlled TOL's
worldwide network. The effect was to deny TOL's subscribers access to the
Internet for three days, for which TOL was later required to reimburse its
customers in the amount of 50 million dollars.
On December 27, 1999, once the TOL website had been restored, a hidden
computer virus was activated. The virus disrupted normal computer operations,
resulting in the loss of unsaved data. Certain files containing words commonly
used in hate speech were deleted. In addition, an e-mail indicating the political
motivations of the group was sent to all subscribers. The International
Babbagian Cyber-Patrol (IBCP) later claimed responsibility for the attack.
On December 29 1999, President Revuluri issued a proclamation in which
he conferred orders .of merit on the members of the IBCP, thanked and praised
the group, and also promised them a full amnesty from prosecution in the
Babbagian courts.
Following the IBCP attack, Josephine Shidle, the Minister of Justice of
Turingia, confirmed that no action was planned by the Turingian government
by way of response. She did, however, publicly state her opinion that should
a Turingian citizen inconvenience the government of Babbage through non-
violent means, Turingia would have no jurisdiction to prosecute. Subsequently,
David Gabrius, a Turingian citizen, hacked into the Babbage Rail Transit
Authority (BRTA) and deleted its operating system. The effect of this was to
eliminate all automated rail traffic control functions for two days, reducing
traffic control to radio contact. In the immediate confusion following in the
wake of the hacking, two trains traveling in opposite directions on a heavily-
used mountain pass crashed into each other, causing fatalities. Turingia
reiterated its decision not to prosecute Gabrius.
Following a joint request by the BRTA Administrator and the Minister of
Justice of Babbage, Tara Elis, that Gabrius come to Babbage to assist with the
repair of the BRTA, and on the express assurance that he would not face
20021
294 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 9:289
prosecution if he did so, Gabrius agreed to go to Babbage. A plane was
chartered by the Government of Babbage to transport Gabrius from Turingia.
However, the request for help was in fact a deliberate ruse constructed for the
purpose of luring Gabrius to Babbage, and on arrival at Babbage International
Airport, the Babbagian national police were waiting to arrest Gabrius. Despite
objections by Turingia as to the manner of the arrest and to the absence of any
right of Babbage to assert jurisdiction over Gabrius, Gabrius was charged, put
on trial and convicted for the murder of the 200 victims of the train collision and
sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.
Under mounting international pressure, Babbage and Turingia have agreed
to submit this dispute to the International Court of Justice.
III. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether Babbage's legislation exceeds its jurisdiction at international law?
2. Whether Babbage's legislation violates the right to freedom of expression
at international law?
3. Whether Babbage is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in
respect of the IBCP's hacking?
4. Whether Babbage is obliged to provide compensation for the IBCP's
interference with TOL' s contractual rights under the law of expropriation?
5. Whether the luring of Gabrius to Babbage violates Turingia's sovereignty?
6. Whether the luring of Gabrius to Babbage violates his human rights?
IV. SUMMARY OF THE PLEADINGS
1. Babbage's legislation is inconsistent with the right to freedom of
expression found in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), which Babbage has signed but not yet ratified.
Babbage is bound by Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties not to act so as to defeat the purpose and object of the ICCPR,
which it has done by imposing broad restrictive provisions on the
publication of indecent materials, thereby impinging on a fundamental
human right. Alternatively, Babbage's legislation has breached a right to
free speech that exists independently at customary international law.
Whilst the right, whether founded in treaty or custom, is not absolute and
may be subject to reasonable limitations assessed on the criteria of
necessity and proportionality, the Babbagian legislation fails on these
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criteria, principally because it is overly broad in its reach and is not the
least intrusive means of achieving the legitimate objective. Hence, it
exceeds what is an acceptable restriction of the right at international law.
2. Babbage is responsible for the loss suffered by TOL because the IBCP's
"cyberactivities" are both attributable to Babbage and in breach of
international obligations owed by Babbage. A state may become
responsible for acts ex post facto where the conduct of the state is such that
it may be seen to have adopted and acknowledged the acts as its own., The
contents of the Presidential proclamation constituted an adoption and
acknowledgement of the activities of the IBCP for the purposes of
attribution. The IBCP attack on TOL, specifically the actions of hacking
into TOL and destroying data, violated the customary prohibition on
cybercrimes. The same actions can also be conceptualized as an
expropriation of TOL's capacity to fulfill its contractual obligations,
necessitating TOL's US$50 million reimbursement of subscribers.
Babbage must make reparations for the loss accordingly.
3. Turingia is not responsible for the damage sustained by the BRTA, as it is
not responsible for the private actions of Gabrius against the BRTA.
While a state may be held responsible for the acts of individuals in various
circumstances, none is applicable to the present case. The statement of the
Minister cannot amount to prior authorization for the purposes of
attribution, as it does not evidence the requisite degree of association. Nor
can the failure to prosecute Gabrius constitute an implicit acknowledgment
or adoption so as to make Turingia subsequently liable for his acts.
Moreover, the actions of Gabrius do not violate any relevant legal
obligation. There is no international prohibition on terrorism, and Gabrius'
acts cannot fall within established prohibitions on the use of force or
unlawful intervention. In any event, the actions may be viewed as
legitimate countermeasures. Furthermore, even if Turingia were
responsible for the actions against the BRTA, this would not extend to
liability for the damage sustained in the train collision, such an injury
being insufficiently causally related to the initial act.
4. The subsequent luring of Gabrius to Babbage was in clear breach of the
territorial sovereignty of Turingia and as such was contrary to international
customary law. Additionally, the luring contravened the customary
prohibition on non-intervention in that it constituted a direct interference
with Turingia's regulation of its sovereign legal and political affairs.
Moreover, the luring was an arbitrary arrest which was in clear violation
of Gabrius' human rights. The manner of the arrest qualified as arbitrary
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because of the unpredictable, coercive nature of the arrest and its
equivalence to forcible abduction. Babbage is also estopped from
prosecuting Gabrius because it is bound by its prior assurance that it would
refrain from doing so, that assurance having the requisite characteristics of
a legally binding undertaking. In view of Babbage's wrongful conduct,
Babbage is obliged to return Gabrius to Turingia.
A. Babbage's Broad Restrictions on the Internet Violate International Law
1. Turingia Has Jus Standi Before the International Court of Justice to
Challenge Babbage's Breach of an Internationally Recognized Right to
Freedom of Speech
a. TOL has a right to impart information
Turingia can claim standing on the grounds that TOL, which we must infer
is a national of Turingia, has a right to impart the types of information that have
been restricted.' The TOL server in Turingia provides original content as well
as transmitting non-original information.
b. The principles and rules regarding basic human rights are
obligations erga omnes, thereby giving Turingia standing to intervene
This Court has held principles and rules concerning basic human rights to
be obligations erga omnes, binding on all states and opposable against any
state.2 The entire international community is obliged to observe and protect
human rights and all states have "a legal interest in their protection." Turingia
thus has standing to intervene on behalf of a non-national to preserve human
rights.
B. Babbage's Extension of its Legislation to the Internet Exceeds its
Jurisdication
1. The Internet is a common space that is not amenable to jurisdiction
Babbage's exercise of jurisdiction over the medium of the Internet is
unreasonable given that it is undefined territory at international law. It is similar
I. G.A. Res. 1997/26, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/40 (1998), available
at http://www.unhchr.chIHuidocdaIHuridocda.nsf/TestFrame/7599319fO2ece82dcl256608004 (last visited
Oct. 4, 2002).
2. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain) (1970) ICJ 3, 42 (Feb. 1970).
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to outer space prior to its regulation.' Until a specific regime is formulated,
Babbage should not act contrary to accepted jurisdictional principles. If this
Court were to extend prescriptive jurisdiction into cyberspace, it would be
formulating rather than declaring law, contrary to its Statute.4
2. In any case, Babbage cannot fulfill any conventional jurisdictional
requirements •
Any enforcement of Babbage's legislation entails a necessary breach of
law, because it is inconsistent with all five conventional principles of
prescriptive jurisdiction.5
Neither the nationality principle nor the subjective territoriality principles
applies to publishers in foreign countries. While some effects of the proscribed
acts occurred within Babbage, any territorial connection is too oblique for the
purposes of the objective territoriality principle. The passive nationality
principle is far from accepted at international law and, even if established, the
exercise of jurisdiction on this basis would be disproportionate to the gravity of
the crime. Such acceptance as it has gained has been largely confined to
terrorism and other internationally condemned crimes.6 The security principle
could not be extended to protect "public morals" without broadening the
principle so as to assert jurisdiction over an indeterminate range of offences,
especially in the context of the Internet. This would undermine state
sovereignty.
C. Babbage's Legislation is in Violation ofArticle 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties
1. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties binds
Babbage
Article 19 of the ICCPR protects freedom of expression. Babbage has
signed but not ratified the ICCPR. Pursuant to Article 18 of the Vienna
3. M. Balsano, An International Legal Instrument for Cyberspace? A Comparative Analysis with
the Law of Outer Space in Padirac (ed.), The International Dimensions of Cyberspace Law, UNESCO (2000)
at 128-130 (2000).
4. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Ch. M, art. 59, available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/Statute/contents.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
5. C. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law
(1999).
6. S. S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (ser A) No. 10, at 82 (Sept. 1927); United States v. Yunis,
681 F Supp 896 (D.D.C. 1988).
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Convention, which Babbage has ratified, it may not curtail free expression so
as to defeat the object and purpose of the ICCPR.
Violating a seminal right, such as freedom of expression, strikes at the
object and purpose of any international human rights instrument. The
fundamental character of this right has been affirmed in domestic constitutions
and by various institutions in the international community, including the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) which declared it to be "the touchstone of
all freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated." 7 It has been further
recognized as underpinning democracy itself.8
Here, the breach of Article 19 is so broad as to breach several other rights,
including the rights to cultural participation, scientific advancement, and
arbitrary interference with correspondence. Such a wide-ranging breach
threatens the object and purpose of the ICCPR.
Further, the obligations at customary law corresponding to Article 18
require parties to do nothing which may diminish the significance of a treaty's
provisions before its entry into force.9 In restricting Article 19 in such a broad
manner, Babbage has done this.
D. Freedom of Expression is a Recognized Human Right
Customary international law requires the co-existence of settled state
practice and opinio juris.'° The right to freedom of expression, including the
rights to receive and impart information "regardless of frontiers," is embodied
in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR. "
The willingness of states to submit to reports by the United Nations Special
Rapporteur and the fact that a diverse majority of states provide constitutional
protection for freedom of expression evidences strong opiniojuris. 12 In addition
7. G.A. Res., UN GAOR, Ist Sess, at 2, UN Doc A/64 (1947); available at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Constitution Act, 1982, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); Report of
the Experts' Meeting on Cyberspace Law, G.A. Res. 36, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc.
CII/USP/ECY/99/01 (1998).
8. Compulsory Membership, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory opinion OC-C5/85
(Nov. 13,1965).
9. Megalidis v. Turk., 8 Recueil des Decisions des Tribunaux Mixtes 386 (1928).
10. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ 14 (June
1986) [hereinafter Nicaragua]; N. Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.) 1969 ICJ 3 (Feb.
1969).
11. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at
http://un.org/Overview.rights.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXII), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1976) available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanarts/instree/b3ccpr.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002) [hereinafter ICCPR].
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, art. 1; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 7, at
art.29; EST. Const. ch. VI, art. 100.
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to its recognition in international human rights instruments, a formidable corpus
of regional instruments evidences broad state acceptance of the right to freedom
of expression.13
E. Babbage's Legislation Falls Outside the Reasonable Limits Imposed by
Customary International Law
The right to freedom of expression is not absolute, as recognized by the
international instruments which restrict it. Both national and transnational
judicial bodies recognize that it is subject to the requirements of necessity and
proportionality. 14
1. A restriction must be necessary in order to achieve a legitimate purpose
Babbage restricts material it deems "offensive" and "contrary to public
morals." The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has included
information that may "offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of its
population" within the category of protected free speech. "5 In dealing with
protected speech, Babbage cannot meet the necessity test unless the restrictions
are proportionate to some compelling interest. Notwithstanding Babbage' s local
conditions, the ECtHR has preferred objective judicial assessment of necessity
over subjective state assessment.6
2. A restriction must be proportionate to its legitimate objective
To be proportionate, the objective must be achieved by the least intrusive
means possible. Babbage's code is unacceptably broad. First, the legislation
and the ISPs' "provider-end" filtering software remove user choice, and in
doing so fail to distinguish between adults and children, which they must do.
17
13. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 1, 1998, art.
10 [hereinafter Convention]; American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," art. 13,
available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-32.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); Inter-American
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, http://www.cidh.oas.org/declaration.htm (last visited Oct.
4, 2002); African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 7, available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z I afchar.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
14. ICCPR, supra note 11; Human Rights Committee Decisions; Convention, supra note 13;
Supreme Court of the United States; Faurisson v. Fr., Communication No. 550/1993, U.N. Doe.
CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (1996), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/VWS55058.htm
(last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
15. Handyside v. U.K., 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 737, at proc. 50(1976); Lingens v. Aus., 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407,
at proc. 41 (1986).
16. Sunday Times v. U.K. (no. 2), 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 229 (1992).
17. ACLU v. Reno 929 F Supp 824 at 854 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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Secondly, they do not make exceptions for material of scientific or artistic
value, access to which is a right. 8
Less intrusive means of restricting hate-speech and pornography were open
to Babbage, such as providing a defense of reasonable compliance. As there can
be no justification for avoidably restricting scientific material, literature and
other non-defamatory material, Babbage must fail the proportionality test.
The vagueness of "offensive in nature to the public morals" leads to
potentially indeterminate liability. In Babbage, this criminal prohibition has had
a chilling effect,'9 resulting in private ISPs imposing overly broad filtering
restrictions.2" Both parties agree that sites that are neither pornographic nor
defamatory in intent have been blocked. The measures taken by the ISPs are
thus a direct consequence of the legislation, and are hence open to this Court's
scrutiny.
The restrictions must also be effective in achieving the desired purpose in
order to be justified. The very nature of the Internet means that blocking
software can be circumvented, and the information accessed and then
disseminated by alternative means. Babbage's law is insufficiently effective to
justify the restrictions on valuable material.
For Babbage's limitations to be "prescribed by law," the law must be clear
enough for citizens to know with reasonable certainty the likely consequences
of a particular action.2' The vagueness of "offensive in nature to the public
morals" prevents this.22 This law's vagueness chills free expression.
3. The Internet's impact justifies minimal restrictions
The ECtHR has recognized that what is an acceptable restriction on free
expression varies with different media, and that the medium's "potential
impact" is an important factor.23 The Internet is a new and unique medium
deserving of special protection. 24 Its interactive and pro-democratic character
means that it should be subject to fewer restrictions than other media.25Further, state practice favors minimal state regulation of the Internet. This
is appropriate as users largely elect the material they view. With the exception
of child pornography, many states do not prohibit adult access to pornography
18. ICCPR, supra note 11.
19. Babbage Criminal Code, § 117(a).
20. Regardless of Frontiers, Global Internet Liberty Campaign Report, 2002, at 27, available at
http://www.cdt.org/gilc/report.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
21. Sunday Times v. U.K., 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245 (1979); Autronic AG v. Switz., available at
http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudocNiewHtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
22. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 854.
23. Jersild v. Den., 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. I (ser. A) No. 298 (1995).
24. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 854.
25. Id. at 873, 883.
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in their Internet and media legislation. Babbage has acted paternalistically in
failing to give its citizens choice where the medium allows it.
V. BABBAGE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE Loss SUFFERED BY TOL
Babbage is responsible for an internationally wrongful act, and has a duty
to make reparations because the IBCP's hacking is (a) attributable to Babbage
and (b) a breach of an international obligation owed by Babbage.26
A. The Claim Brought by Turingia for the Damage to TOL is Admissible
1. Turingia may exercise its right of diplomatic protection of TOL because
at the time of the hacking TOL was (and still is) a national of Turingia
Companies may be nationals for the purpose of diplomatic protection.27
There is a genuine and substantial connection between TOL and Turingia.28 As
a private company based in Turingia, it is likely that its place of incorporation
and residency for taxation purposes, its head office and administrative organs
are in Turingia 9 This close and permanent connection is not weakened by
TOL's commercial activities overseas.3 °
2. There are no available and effective remedies open to TOL in Babbage
The requirement that local remedies must be exhausted may come within
the jurisdictional waiver. Alternatively, as litigants need only exhaust such
remedies as are available and effective,3 TOL has discharged its duty under the
rule. There are no laws in force in Babbage dealing specifically with
cybercrime. Although a remedy may exist in the general law, the transnational
nature of the hacking and harm make any such remedy inappropriate.
Further, the Babbagian proclamation on the IBCP and the readiness of
President Revuluri to use his law-making powers regarding the Internet are
26. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, International Law
Commission, 53rd Sess., G.A. Supp. No. 10 (A/56/10) (2001); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, at 29 (May 1980).
27. LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 425 (5th ed. 1998).
28. Nottebohm (Second Phase) (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, at 23 (Apr.1955); Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd., 1970 I.C.J. at 42.
29. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd., 1970 I.C.J at 42.
30. Id.; Special Agreement between the Republic of Turingia (Applicant) and the Republic of
Babbage (Respondent) on the differences between them concerning regulation of access to the internet
(Compromis), [ 5.
31. Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, at 38-39 (July 1957); Finnish Shipowners
Arbitration (Fin. v. U.K.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1479, at 1504 (1934).
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evidence that the Babbagian courts are, in effect, subordinate to the Babbagian
executive on this issue. When the prevailing conditions make the courts
subordinate to the executive, any domestic remedies are considered to be
ineffective.3
2
B. The Actions of the IBCP Are Attributable to Babbage
The IBCP's hacking into TOL should be attributed to Babbage as Babbage
acknowledged, exploited and adopted the IBCP's acts.
1. The cumulative effect of Babbage's conduct amounts to an adoption of
the hacking for which Babbage is responsible
States may become responsible at customary international law for acts ex
post facto.33 Article 11 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles
on State Responsibility (Draft Articles) recognizes that acts of private persons
shall be attributed to the state "to the extent that the State acknowledges and
adopts the conduct in question as its own." In this respect there must be more
than a mere endorsement or acknowledgement. 34 Babbage expressed its support
for the hacking in several ways. After the ICBP had publicly acknowledged
responsibility for the hacking, President Revuluri granted them "full amnesty,"
and expressed Babbage's gratitude to the IBCP. In another unqualified and
unequivocal act, the IBCP members were rewarded with Babbagian national
honors. These acts, taken in sum, constituted an acknowledgement and
adoption of the acts of the IBCP, if not a policy of adoption. The President's
statement on December 19, 1999 may haVe encouraged the commission of acts
against TOL. While states may publicly endorse acts without attracting
responsibility for them, Babbage went beyond mere support by capitalizing on
and exploiting the hacking for its national benefit. Exploitation, if not a
necessary condition, is certainly sufficient.35
32. See Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law (1990) 196-7 and 242-4; Browns Claim
(1923) RIAA, vi, 120.
33. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26;
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3; Lighthouses Arbitration (1956)
R.I.A.A., xii, 155.
34. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3; Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
35. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3. See also United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, supra note 26
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2. An act may be adopted after it has been executed
As recognized in Article 11 of the Draft Articles, a state is deemed
responsible for an act adopted ex post facto as if it was involved from the act's
inception.36 Article 11 is not qualified expressly or implicitly by any reference
to a "continuous act."
The adoption doctrine must be both legally and logically distinct from
authorization. 37 Article 11 would be rendered redundant if only continuing acts
could be adopted, as the rules of authorization cover such acts from the point of
state involvement. It is therefore consistent with the law on state responsibility
to find that Babbage has adopted the hacking of the IBCP notwithstanding that
the hacking had ended before its adoption.
3. If a continuing act is required, Babbage's amnesty will apply to IBCP
hacking in the future, thereby facilitating such conduct. Thus Babbage has
effectively adopted this hacking ex ante
On its face, the grant of full amnesty applied not only to the 1999 hacking
but also to any future hacking committed by the ICBP. In effect, Babbage has
thus adopted any such acts ex ante.
C. The IBCP's Attack on TOL was an Internationally Wrongful Act
1. Babbage has breached the customary international law prohibition against
cybercrime
a. There is a prohibition against cybercrime at customary
international law
Since the early 1990s, rapidly evolving state practice has established a
customary prohibition on cybercrime. Prohibitions on unlawful access to and/or
interference with computer data have now been enacted in at least thirty-eight
states.38 The most recent multilateral development is the Convention on
Cybercrime 2001 39 which has already attracted the signatures of thirty-two
states since being opened for signature in November 2001 .40 The evident
willingness of states to rapidly assume international legal obligations in this
36. See J.G. STARKE & I.A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 275 (11 th ed. 1994).
37. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
38. Stein Schjolberg, The Legal Framework-Unauthorized Access to Computer Systems: Penal
Legislation in 44 Countries, at www.mossbyrett.of.no/info/legal/html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
39. Convention on Cybercrime-Budapest, ETS No. 185, at
http://book.coe.int/GB/CAT/LIV/HTM/1 1860.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
40. See Convention on Cybercrime, at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/searching.asp?NT= I 85&CM=&DF= (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
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field is compelling evidence of both the momentum and extent of state practice
and convergent opinio juris. Such opinio juris is also expressed by those
transnational institutions that emphasise the need to fight cybercrime.41
Although state practice regarding cybercrime is less noticeable outside of
developed Western states, the comparative technological ascendancy of the
West has simply generated a greater incidence of cybercrime warranting
regulation. In this regard, evidence of customary law is properly to be
ascertained by reference to those states "specially affected" by cybercrime. 42
b. Babbage breached the prohibition against cybercrime
The two activities consistently proscribed in both domestic and
international legal provisions on cybercrime are unlawful access to, and
interference with, data. These prohibitions therefore represent the irreducible
core of customary law.43 The IBCP breached international law twice by both
illegally accessing and deleting TOL's data.'
2. The hacking attributed to Babbage was an act of expropriation
Subject to limitations, states have the right to expropriate foreign-owned
property at international law.45 Expropriation encompasses acts that fall short
of transferred ownership or possession.46 Babbage has deprived TOL of its
capacity to fulfill its subscription contracts by interfering with its informational
assets.
a. The concept of property for expropriation purposes
includes contractual rights
Expropriation has been recognized as extending to "any right which can
be the object of a commercial transaction, ie, freely bought and sold, and thus
has a monetary value. '47 This definition from Amoco, the culmination of the
41. OECD Expert Committee Recommendation, 1973; Resolution No. 3 on the Fight Against
Cyber-Crime, available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/LegaLaffairs/Legalco-operation/Conferences and-high-
level (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
42. N. Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 42-43.
43. See Convention on Cybercrime-Budapest, supra note 39; Art. 3211-3321 of the French Penal
Code; German Penal Code §§ 203, 303(a), (b); Electronic Commerce Act, ch. 426 (2002) (Malta); Republic
Act No. 8792, sec. 33 (2000) (Phil.).
44. Compromis, supra 30, at 14.
45. G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/cnatres.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); BROWNLIE, supra note 27 at
535.
46. M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 575 (4th ed. 1997).
47. Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. CTR 189, at 108 (1987).
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Iran-US Claims Tribunal' s jurisprudence on contractual expropriation, is widely
supported. 48 Babbage has expropriated TOL's contractual rights by interfering
with its capacity to fulfill these contracts.
Alternatively, if the Court considers that contractual expropriation must be
contingent on some physical interference, Babbage's deletion of TOL's data
was such an interference. TOL was thereby deprived of the ability to honor its
contractual obligations.49
b. Measures falling short of direct divestiture qualify as
"expropriations"'5
"Constructive expropriation" is widely recognized in case law and state
practice.5  This occurs when the "events demonstrate that the owner was
deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that deprivation was
not merely ephemeral."52 Here TOL was deprived of its informational assets,
an interference constituting a taking for the purposes of expropriation because
TOL was prevented from enjoying its property.53 TOL's ability to rebuild its
assets from backed-up data does not diminish the interference in any way. The
"reality of [the] impact" of the interference and its "effects" on TOL are more
important than the government's intent and the form of the interference. "
While Babbage expropriated TOL's property in Turingia, the territorial
location of expropriation is not determinative. Although expropriation is
typically associated with the nationalization context, 55 the same principles must
apply to other interferences causing a deprivation of property. By its nature
cyberspace knows no territorial limitations and international law must adapt to
this new medium.
48. Mobile Oil Iran Inc. v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. CTR 3, at 25 (1987); Anglo-Iranian Oil (U.K. v. Iran),
1951 I.C.J. 89 (July 1951), as per the United Kingdom's government pleadings; Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran,
23 I.L.M. 1090, 1115 (Sept. 1984); Shufeldt Claim (U.S. v. Guat.) 2 R.I.A.A. 1083, at 1097 (1930).
49. Starrett Housing Corp., 23 I.L.M. at 1115.
50. For example, Sedco Inc., v. NIOC, 9 Iran-U.S. CTR 248 (1985); Kalamazoo Spice Extraction
Co., v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Eth., 86 I.L.R. 45 (1984).
51. 1964 BP1L 200.
52. Tippetts v. TAMS-ATTA (1985) 6 Iran-US CTR 219, at 225 (1985).
53. Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens, 55 A.J.I.L. 548, 553 (1961); Starrett Housing Corp., 23 I.L.M. at 1115; Third U.S.
Restatement on Foreign Relations Law, vol. H, 1 712.
54. Tippetts, 6 Iran-U.S. CTR at 226.
55. For example, Starrett Housing Corp., 23 I.L.M. at 1116-117; Tippetts, 6 Iran-U.S. CTR at 226;
Amoco, 15 Iran-U.S. CTR at 108.
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c. Babbage must compensate Turingia for the full market value of TOL's
failure to provide consumer services
Expropriation has always required full market value compensation. 6
Although several UNGA resolutions in the 1960s and 1970s refer to a more
flexible standard of "appropriate compensation, 57 consideration of the "content
and conditions of [their] adoption"58 reveal their inadequacy as evidence of new
customary international law. These resolutions received insufficiently
widespread support, especially amongst capital-exporting states, to indicate the
emergence of a new standard.59 Moreover, the act of expropriation in the
present case falls outside the ambit of these resolutions, which were intended to
apply to the nationalization of natural resources.6° On this basis, Babbage must
compensate Turingia fifty million dollars, the full market value of the lost
subscription services.
D. Turingia is Entitled to $50M Damages to Compensate it for the TOL Loss
Having breached an international obligation, Babbage has a duty to make
reparations which "wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act" and restore
the status quo ante.61 But for the hacking, TOL would not have been required
to pay out fifty million dollars to its customers.
VI. TURINGIA Is NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAMAGE CAUSED TO BABBAGE
RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY (BRTA), NOR FOR ANY HARM RESULTING FROM
SUCH DAMAGE
A. The Acts of David Gabrius are Not Attributable to Babbage
Gabrius is not formally affiliated with the Turingian government. Prima
facie, the acts of a private individual are not attributable to the state under
international law.62 Further, Gabrius' conduct cannot be imputed to Turingia.
56. Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 46-48 (Sept. 1928); Sedco Inc.,
9 fran-U.S. CTR at 248; Amoco, 15 Iran-U.S. CTR at 108.
57. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962) available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/c2pnsr.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002), G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR,
28th Sess., at 239, U.N. Doc. A/9400 (1974), G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., at 255, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3281 (1975).
58. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 809, 826
(July 1996).
59. See Texaco v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 389, at 488-89 (1977); Sedco Inc., 9 Iran-U.S. CTR at 248.
60. Sedco Inc., 9 Iran-U.S. CTR at 634.
61. Chorzow Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 46-48; Spanish Zone in Morocco Claims 2
R.I.A.A., ii, 615, at 641 (1925); SHAW, supra note 46, at 641.
62. Commentary to Draft Articles, supra note 26, at 103.
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1. Turingia did not authorize Gabrius' acts
Authorization requires acts to be done under the instruction, direction or
control of the state.63 The Turingian Minister of Justice's statement on
December 29, 1999 did not authorize Gabrius' hacking. It was simply an
expression of opinion as to a lack of jurisdiction to prosecute, a point reiterated
after the attack.6 A high degree of association between the state and a private
action is required to engage state responsibility.65 If the heavy US involvement
in Nicaragua was insufficient in this regard, the general and ambiguous
statement of the Minister surely cannot qualify as an authorization.66 Where a
variable degree of control has been recognized, "overall control going beyond
the mere financing and equipping of.. .forces" is still required.67
Even if the statement is construed as a promise of amnesty, this was limited
to acts causing an inconvenience to the government of Babbage of a kind
similar to that caused by the IBCP. The deletion of an entire railroad network's
operating system fell outside the scope of any authorization.
2. Turingia did not adopt Gabrius' conduct
Turingia's failure to prosecute Gabrius does not amount to
acknowledgement and adoption of his conduct as its own.68 Even if this could
be seen as endorsing Gabrius' conduct, it is insufficient to constitute an
adoption. 69 Accordingly, Turingia cannot be held responsible for the actions of
Gabrius.
B. Gabrius' Conduct did not Constitute a Breach of a Relevant International
Obligation
1. There is no customary international prohibition on terrorism
While certain categories of terrorist activities are the subject of specific
conventions,7° there is neither a comprehensive convention on terrorism per se
63. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
64. Compromis, supra note 30, at 22.
65. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 97-98.
66. Id. at 60-62.
67. Id.
68. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
69. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, supra note 26.
70. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979), available at
http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorismconventionjhostages.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2002); International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (1998), available at
http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorism-conventionterroristbombing.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
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nor even an agreed definition of the term.7 Significantly, the Statute of the
International Criminal Court, which purports to be declaratory of customary
international law, does not include terrorism as a discrete international crime.72
2. The actions of Gabrius were not an unlawful intervention
According to the principle of non-intervention, no state has the right "to
intervene.. .in the internal or external affairs of any other state."73 States are
prohibited from intervening in matters in which states are deemed to have free
choice by virtue of their sovereignty.74
The acts directed against the BRTA were aimed neither at "the
subordination of the exercise of [Babbage's] sovereign rights" nor the
"undermining of its socio-political system." 5. Gabrius' acts do not fall within
this prohibition.
3. The actions of Gabrius were not a use of force
Hacking into the BRTA computer network and deleting the operating
system cannot be considered a use of force contrary to the prohibition in Article
2(4) of the UN Charter. That prohibition only embraces the use of armed force
against another state.76 Non-armed acts, such as those of Gabrius, are outside
the scope of the rule. The international community equates the use of armed
force with acts of aggression, which is hardly the situation here.77
4. However, if the Court were to find the existence of an internationally
wrongful act, the wrongfulness is precluded in the circumstances
a. Gabrius' acts constituted a lawful countermeasure
In certain circumstances, a state may take countermeasures against a state
that would be unlawful were they not in response to a prior violation by that
71. Libyan Arab Republic 726 F2d 774, 785 (DC Cir 1984).
72. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
73. U.N. Declaration on Intervention, 5 I.L.M. 374,375-76 (Mar. 1966); United Nations Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, 9 I.L.M.
1292, at 1296 (Nov. 1970); Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 107.
74. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 107.
75. Inadmissibility of the Policy of State Terrorism and any Actions by States Aimed at
Undermining the Socio-political System in Other Sovereign States, available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39/a39rl59.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
76. GOODRICH, HAMBRO, & SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 49 (3rd ed. 1969).
77. See G.A. Res. 3314, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/3314.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
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state.78 While the Draft Articles recognize only non-forcible measures,7 9 the ICJ
in Nicaragua "suggested" that proportionate forcible countermeasures would
be available in response to acts involving the use of force. 80 Thus, even if
Gabrius' hacking is deemed a "use of force," it is consistent with international
law. Alternatively, if lawful countermeasures must be non-forcible, Gabrius'
acts do not involve the use of force, in that they fall well short of the terms of
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.8
Since Babbage has breached several international obligations owed to
Turingia, including the obligation to make reparations for a wrong, the
preconditions for a lawful countermeasure are satisfied.82
To be justified, countermeasures must meet the requirement of
proportionality.83 It has been recognized that countermeasures taken in a similar
field to the original act meet the proportionality requirement, even if these have
a severe impact.84 Similar reasoning may be applied to Gabrius' "hacking"
which mirrored that of the IBCP. Importantly, the scope of the countermeasure
extends only to the loss of automated rail traffic control. As the train collision
and casualties were not "caused" by the acts against the BRTA,85 they are
excluded from any assessment of proportionality.
C. Injuries Not Caused By Unlawful Act
Even if it has committed an international wrong, Turingia is only
responsible for the injuries caused by that violation. Causation may be satisfied
in respect of damage to the BRTA computer system. In relation to the train
collision and loss of life, however, there is no sufficiently direct, foreseeable or
proximate relationship between Gabrius' acts and the injury to satisfy the
requirements of causation at international law.86 The crash was the culmination
of a number of improbable circumstances.87 The route was a mountain pass,88
reducing visual contact between trains and emergency stopping time. Being a
78. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 55-56 (Sept. 1997); Nauililaa (Port.
v. Ger.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1011, at 1025-26 (1928); Air Serv. Agreement (Fr. v. U.S.), 18 R.I.A.A. 416, at 443-46
(Mar. 1979); Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
79. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
80. Nicaragua, 1986 1.C.J. at 109-110.
81. Id. at 19.
82. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.CJ. at 107, Part B; Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
83. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
84. Air Serv. Agreement, 18 R.I.A.A. at 443-46.
85. Infra p. 17, point IIl C.
86. Venable Claim, 4 R.I.A.A. 219, at 225 (1927); Naulilaa, 2 R.I.A.A. at 1031.
87. Naulilaa, 2 R.I.A.A. at 1031.
88. Compromis, supra note 30, at 1 21.
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heavily used route there was less time to put into proper effect the default radio
control system.89 The absence of any.effective fallback mechanism was itself
improbable.
The damage and fatalities are sufficiently divorced from the initial
"hacking" into the BRTA network so as to be categorized as "too indirect,
remote and uncertain" 90 for Turingia to be held causally responsible.
VH. THE LURING OF GABRIUS VIOLATED THE SOVEREIGNTY OF TURINGIA
A. The Luring of Gabrius to Babbage Violated the Territorial Sovereignty of
Turingia
1. Extraterritorial criminal enforcement
The exercise of sovereign powers by one state in the territory of another is
prohibited at customary international law.9' In the absence of consent by the
asylum state, pursuing criminal enforcement measures such as the abduction of
a suspect from within the territory of that state clearly contravenes this
prohibition.92
2. Male captus bene detentus does not undermine the prohibition
While some states' domestic courts have continued to assert jurisdiction
over suspects seized in breach of international law, states must "justify their
conduct by reference to a new right" at international law in orer to modify or
create exceptions to established customary law.93 Domestic courts employing
the male captus bene detentus doctrine have, however, tended to do so on the
basis of domestic precedent rather than international law94 and have even
acknowledged that conduct excused by the doctrine may be contrary to
international law.95 Thus, the opinio juris underpinning the customary
89. Id. at 20.
90. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. 1095, at 1931 (1938, 1941).
91. S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 34-35; OPPENHEIM;S INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 (H
Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
92. Paul Michell, Article, English-Speaking Justice: Evolving Responses to Transnational Forcible
Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 383, 410 (1996); Legal Opinion on the Decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Alvarez-Machain Case, Inter-American Judicial Committee 13 H.R.L.J. 395
(1992); Virginia Morris and M. -Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, Current Development: The Work of the
Sixth Committee at the Forty-Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly, 88 A.J.I.L. 343, 357-78 (1994).
93. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C. J. at 108-09.
94. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 505 U.S. 655 (1992); Levinge v. Dir. Of Custodial Serv.,
9 N.S.W.L.R. 546 (Ca. 1987).
95. Alvarez-Machain. 505 U.S. at 667; In re Hartnett I O.R. 2d 206, 209 (1973).
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prohibition on extraterritorial criminal enforcement remains undisturbed by this
practice.
3. Breach of Turingian territorial sovereignty - aeroplane and aircrew
The Ministerial signing of the assurance to Gabrius, the presence of the
Babbagian law enforcement officers at the airport, and the hiring of the aircraft
and crew by the government implicate senior Babbagian officials in the luring
of Gabrius, thus engaging state responsibility for the luring itself. From the
moment of the deceptive assurance, the criminal enforcement operation against
Gabrius was effectively a continuous act. The participation of the Babbagian-
funded aircrew in this continuous operation ensured that a key element of
Babbage's sovereign act was performed both in Turingian airspace 96 and on
Turingian soil, thus violating Turingian territorial sovereignty. 97
4. Turingia did not consent to the transborder criminal enforcement
There is no breach of territorial sovereignty if the asylum state consents to
the relevant transborder criminal enforcement action.98 However, Turingian
officials were unaware of the purpose of the Babbagian chartered flight and
immediately protested on discovering the deception. As such, Turingia cannot
be said to have waived its sovereign rights.
5. Babbage's unilateral execution of criminal enforcement measures violates
the principle of non-intervention
a. Babbage has interfered with Turingia' s prosecutorial and political
integrity
The principle of non-intervention protects the authority of states to make
free choices about matters within their sovereign jurisdiction.99 The pursuit of
criminal enforcement measures is a sovereign act."° Political integrity is also
to be respected at international law.'0 ' Turingia decided at the highest level of
government that it had neither the jurisdiction nor the inclination to prosecute
96. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 127-28.
97. See Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic, Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused
Slavko Dokmanovic, No. IT-95-13a-PT, T Ch. 11, 22 (Oct. 1997).
98. Michell, supra note 92, at 420.
99. Id. at 15.
100. Id. at 18.
101. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 106.
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Gabrius. 10 2 Babbage's luring of Gabrius thus constituted a direct interference
with Turingia' s regulation of its sovereign legal and political affairs.
b. The equivalence of deception and coercion
Although the ICJ in Nicaragua referred to an element of coercion within
the prohibition against non-intervention, it confined its exposition of principle
to those elements necessary to the case before it. °3 The sovereign freedom of
state decision-making, the core principle protected by the prohibition," may be
imperiled equally by the use of force or fraud. Moreover, unlike consensual
extradition processes, unilateral extraterritorial criminal enforcement measures
such as abduction or luring inherently interfere in the internal affairs of other
states. In fraudulently undermining high-level Turingian legal and political
decisions, Babbage subordinated Turingia's sovereign will in a manner
inconsistent with the sovereign equality of states. 1
05
B. The Luring of Gabrius Violated His Human Rights
1. Babbage was prohibited from arbitrarily arresting
Gabrius at international law
Like freedom of expression, the prohibition against arbitrary arrest has
crystallized into customary international law, 10 6 as evidenced by an equally
formidable body of domestic and transnational human rights instruments. 10
7
Alternatively, even if the prohibition is not a part of international custom, it is
sufficiently fundamental to the ICCPR that its breach will necessarily entail a
violation of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.'
Without such a prohibition, freedom of expression, the rule of law and other
incidents of a democracy are substantially undermined.
102. Compromis, supra note 30, at9[ 19, 22.
103. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 108.
104. Id.
105. United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States, supra note 73.
106. See Id. at 3-4.
107. See UDHR, art. 9, supra note 10, ICCPR, supra note 11, at art. 9(1); African [Banjul] Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 13; Convention, supra note 13, at art. 5(1); American Convention
on Human Rights "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," supra note 13, at art. 7; Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, supra note 12, at art. 9 See N.Z. Bill of Rights, art. 9, available at
http://www.uniwuerzburg.de/law/nz0l000_.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
108. See supra at 2 and 3.
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a. Babbage's arrest of Gabrius was "arbitrary"
Babbage's arrest of Gabrius was arbitrary, and hence contrary to
international law, on four separate grounds. First, the arbitrariness criterion
encompasses any legal deprivation that is unjust, unpredictable, manifestly
disproportionate, discriminatory, or inappropriate to the circumstances of the
case.'0 9 It is difficult to imagine an arrest more unpredictable than one
following an explicit governmental assurance of immunity.
Secondly, forcible abduction has been deemed manifestly arbitrary in the
case law. "' Nothing in principle distinguishes luring, as fraudulent inducement
"robs the victim of the power of autonomous decision and action as surely as
does physical coercion."''. If viewed in the positive terms of the right to liberty,
both luring and abduction deprive an arrested fugitive of the power to exercise
that right in autonomous fashion. Thus luring is "arbitrary."
Thirdly, a continuum of coercion has been recognized as informing the
prohibition on arbitrary arrest.' 12 Unlike situations where police have been
given leeway to exploit a criminal's own greed," 3 the Babbagian assurance was
coercive in preying on Gabrius' goodwill and feeling of responsibility for the
unfortunate events in Babbage. If the use of such "moral" coercion is deemed
consistent with international human rights norms, in the future hackers will only
be deterred from providing potentially valuable assistance to governments. The
deterrence of international co-operation is particularly unfortunate in the case
of developing nations with simplistic technological infrastructures, like
Babbage, which could well benefit from assistance provided by those
responsible for any such damage.
Fourthly, arrests circumventing established procedures for obtaining
custody, such as extradition treaties, have also been deemed manifestly
arbitrary." 4 Extradition processes contain significant due process safeguards for
the accused, and hence have an important human rights dimension." 5 By
contrast, unilateral measures such as abduction or luring are completely
unconstrained, the very definition of "arbitrary." '"1 6  The absence of an
extradition treaty between Babbage and Turingia cannot excuse the
employment of unilateral, arbitrary measures.
109. Prosecutor, No. IT-95-13A-PT, TCh. II at 484; M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: CCPR Commentary, at 173 (1993).
110. Prosecutor, No. IT-95-13A-PT, T Ch. 11 at 487.
Ill. In re Schmidt I AC at 359 per Sedley J (1995).
112. Prosecutor, No. IT-95-13A-PT, T Ch. II at 483; Michell, supra note 92, at 490-91.
113. Liangsiriprasert v. United States, I AC 225, at 243 (PC) (1991).
114. Prosecutor, No. IT-95-13A-PT, T Ch. II at 487; Nowak, supra note 109, at 173.
115. Michell, supra note 92, at 437-38.
116. Miriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, available at www.n-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary.
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2. The high court of Babbage breached a further aspect of the right
A necessary corollary of the right to liberty, recognized in Article 9(4) of
the ICCPR, is the right of an accused to obtain an order for release in the event
of an arbitrary arrest. The refusal of the Babbagian high court on appeal to
make such an order, despite the prior conduct of the criminal enforcement
authorities, thus constitutes an independent breach of customary international
law.
C. Babbage Was Estopped From Prosecuting Gabrius
1. Babbage may not resile from its legal undertaking
The ICJ has recognized that states may bind themselves to a course of
conduct via unilateral undertakings." 7 To be legally effective, the undertaking
must be given publicly, with an intention to be bound." 8 The intent behind an
alleged undertaking must be assessed in the context of the principle of good
faith, with the trust and confidence inherent in international co-operation
implying that interested states may place confidence in unilateral declarations. "9
Ultimately, the substance and context of such statements determines their legal
effect. 0
a. Babbage was bound by its undertaking not to prosecute or harm
Gabrius
The statement was publicly made by a Minister competent to speak for the
Babbagian government on prosecutorial matters.' 2 ' Even if Babbage never
intended to be bound by its assurance, the unambiguous content of the statement
is determinative. There was no reason for Gabrius to doubt the sincerity of the
plea for assistance. In accordance with the principle of good faith, Babbage
must be held to its public undertaking.
Although deemed unnecessary in the Nuclear Tests case, 122 any
requirement of a valid offer and acceptance 2 1 would be satisfied on the facts.
Gabrius clearly offered his services by way of consideration for the promise of
immunity.
117. Nuclear Tests (Aust. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 332-33 (Dec. 1974); Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J at 130-
31.
118. Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at 332-33.
119. Id. at 334.
120. Id. at 336.
121. Compromis, supra note 30, at T 23; See also Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at 332-33.
122. Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at 332-33.
123. Nicaragua, 1986 L.C.J. at 131-32.
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D. Babbage is Obliged to Restore Gabrius to Turingia
1. Babbage is obliged at international law to return Gabrius to Turingia
International law stipulates that the injured state should be returned to the
status quo ante following a breach so as to "re-establish the situation which
would.. .have existed if that act had not been committed.' ' 24 An application of
the preference expressed in Chorzow Factory for "[r]estitution in kind"'' 25
requires that Babbage return Gabrius, who was arrested in breach of Turingian
sovereignty and Gabrius' human rights, to Turingia. The return of Gabrius
would also be consistent with state practice in cases of illegal rendition. 126
Turingia's immediate protest also rebuts any question of waiver of a claim to
restitution. 127
VIII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Turingia respectfully asks this Court to declare and adjudge that:
1. Babbage's broad restrictions on access to Internet-available resources, its
extension of its criminal code to the Internet, and its application of the
code to Turingia OnLine and Babbage Online, violate international law.
2. Babbage is responsible for the loss suffered by Turingia Online and is
liable to pay damages in the sum of fifty million dollars.
3. Turingia is not responsible for the damage caused to the Babbage Rail
Transit Authority or for any harm resulting from such damage, in particular
the train crash resulting in loss of life.
4. Babbage's luring, arrest, trial and conviction of a Turingian citizen, David
Garbrius, violated international law.
5. David Gabrius must immediately be released and repatriated.
Respectfully submitted,
Agents for Turingia.
124. Chorzow Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 46-48. See also Texaco, 53 I.L.R. 389;
Michell, supra note 92, at 419.
125. Chorzow Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 46-48.
126. Michell, supra note 92, at 424-27 and accompanying footnotes.
127. See BROWNLIE, supra note 27, at 31; Michell, supra note 92, at 420-27; Compromis, supra note
30, at 125.
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